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WHEN WILL THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAIVE THE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE AND DISPOSE
OF ITS VIOLATIONS PROPERLY?
MIKE ROTHMEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has always envisioned that the federal government would
play a lead role in compliance with federal environmental regulations.1
Unfortunately, federally owned facilities are part of the pollution prob-
lem and not part of the solution. 2 The Department of Defense generates
over 500,000 tons of hazardous waste per year at 333 installations while
the Department of Energy generates 2.5 million tons of hazardous waste
and 16 million tons of mixed hazardous and radioactive waste per year.
3
In disposing of this waste federal facilities violate pollution laws with
impunity. 4 The Justice Department has continually worked to tie the
hands of both the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
states when they attempt to impose penalties on federal facilities for vio-
lating the nation's pollution laws. 5
At the federal level, EPA enforcement consists of little more than
extended negotiations that can be delayed for over two years before reso-
lution occurs because the Justice Department has refused to allow the
* I would like to thank Professor Richard Wright of IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law whose
thoughts and comments have helped me greatly.
1. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1079, 1277.
2. Id. The Rocky Mountain Arsenal, an Army disposal site in Colorado, is said to contain
"the most toxic square mile on earth." Pollack and Shulman, The Environment: Toxic Responsibil-
ity, THE ATLANTIC, March 1989, at 26. The military admitted, in a 1988 report to the Pentagon,
that common disposal practices included "discharge on the ground into unlined pits or local creeks,"
"pouring and spraying on the ground," "drainage to industrial sewers," and "storage in leaking
underground tanks." Id. at 28. At a recent congressional hearing, the Attorney General of Colo-
rado stated that "the federal government has been one of the nation's worst violators of [federal] and
state hazardous-waste laws," and the Attorney General of Ohio testified to the "widespread and
long-standing disregard by federal facilities of hazardous-waste requirements designed to protect the
safety of our citizens." Id.
3. Frandsen, Will Federal Facilities Be Forced to Face Up to RCRA?, 5 ENVTL. F. 29 (1988).
4. Id. at 30-31. See also Porter, EPA Dispute Resolution Schedule for Federal Facility Compli-
ance Under RCRA, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 41:3401 (May 13, 1988). This memorandum set out crite-
ria to shorten the negotiating time between the EPA and federal facilities violating RCRA. The
memorandum noted that "[m]any Regions have expressed frustration in their apparent inability to
compel the conclusion of these negotiations." Id.
5. Porter, EPA Memorandum on Enforcement Actions at Federal Facilities Under RCRA and
CERCLA, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 41:3341 (March II, 1988). For a discussion of the process the EPA
uses to enforce RCRA at federal facilities, see infra note 275.
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EPA to issue compliance orders to or to seek civil penalties against fed-
eral facilities that violate the law. 6 At the state level, the Justice Depart-
ment has hindered state enforcement by relying on the shield of
sovereign immunity to avoid complying with the nation's antipollution
laws. 7 The shield is effective because of the unique structure of the pollu-
tion laws. Under most of the environmental laws, the EPA sets mini-
mum pollution standards for a pollution program and the states have the
option of administering these programs in lieu of the EPA.8 If a state
cites a federal facility for a violation, the facility can claim that it is im-
mune from state regulation because the sovereign has not consented to
being sued.9 Although these acts all contain sovereign immunity waiv-
ers, 10 most courts have held that these waivers "require" federal compli-
ance without giving up sovereign immunity with regard to state initiated
enforcement actions (except under the Clean Air Act).11 Thus, when a
federal facility violates an environmental statute, the states cannot im-
pose a penalty on the facility and all the EPA can do is attempt to cajole
the recalcitrant agency into compliance, an action which history has
proved to have little impact on agency behavior. 12
6. House Staff Report Hits DOD [Department of Defense], DOE [Department of Energy] for
Violations of Environmental Statute, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 199 (June 10, 1988). The article quoted
the report as stating that the EPA had to rely on "jawboning at elevated bureaucratic levels" to
enforce RCRA at federal facilities. Id. at 199. The article noted that at one facility in Ohio, the
DOE had rototilled 50,000 gallons of contaminated solvent into the ground "resulting in trichloro-
ethylene contamination of 790,000 parts per billion in a well, 158,000 times EPA's drinking water
standard." Id. The Justice Department has refused to represent the EPA against federal facilities
because it adheres to the "unitary executive" theory. Suits Against Federal Agencies Possible, EPA
Deputy Administrator Nominee Tells Senate, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 142 (May 19, 1989). Under that
theory one federal agency may not sue another. The Justice Department maintains that only the
President can arbitrate disputes between administrative agencies. Id.
7. Chief Justice Marshall first expounded upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity in McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Although sovereign immunity is an English doc-
trine, it found its way into the American system of government through the supremacy clause of the
Constitution. The doctrine, derived from the Supremacy Clause (U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2), prevents
a state from regulating an instrumentality of the federal government, (i.e. government agency, prop-
erty, etc.) without the express consent of the federal government through an act of Congress. Good-
year Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 186-88 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
8. See the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6991 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). All establish minimum standards for pollution control, allow
the states to set more stringent standards and offer the states the opportunity to enforce those
standards.
9. Breen, Federal Supremacy and Sovereign Immunity Waivers in Federal Environmental Law,
15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10326, 10327 (1985).
10. These waivers are included in the Clean Air Act § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 7418, see infra note 136;
the Clean Water Act § 313, 33 U.S.C. § 1323, see infra note 151 and accompanying text; and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 6001, 42 U.S.C. § 6961, see infra note 189 and accompa-
nying text.
11. See infra section IV.
12. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
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This Note will examine whether the sovereign immunity waivers in
the Clean Air Act (CAA),13 Clean Water Act (CWA),' 4 and the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)' 5 authorize state en-
forcement against federal facilities. After a brief overview of the three
statutes, the Note will first analyze the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Hancock v. Train 16 and United States EPA v. California ex rel. State
Water Resources Control Board 17 to glean the Supreme Court's criteria
for determining whether a statute waives sovereign immunity to a partic-
ular action. The Note will then analyze the current sovereign immunity
waivers in the CAA, CWA, and RCRA to determine whether they meet
the Supreme Court's guidelines established in Hancock and United States
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board. Finally,
the Note will explore future possibilities for bringing about federal gov-
ernment compliance with its own laws.
II. THE FEDERAL POLLUTION LAWS
To understand how sovereign immunity defeats the enforcement of
pollution laws against the federal government one must first understand
how those laws operate. All three laws encourage a federal-state partner-
ship to administer and enforce them. First, Congress or the EPA
promulgates standards for pollution control. 8 Next, the states have the
option to enact their own legislation to implement and enforce the fed-
eral standards or their own more stringent standards.19 If the state's im-
plementation and enforcement is inadequate, the EPA takes over
implementation from the state. 20 This. section will be divided into two
parts. First, it will explain the structure of each Act in more detail. Sec-
ond, it will discuss enforcement under the Acts in general.
A. Structure
The CAA takes a two step approach to air pollution control. First,
the EPA establishes nationally uniform concentration limits for pollu-
tants that it deems harmful to public health, called National Ambient
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642.
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991.
16. 426 U.S. 167, 178 (1976).
17. 426 U.S. 200, 211 (1976).
18. Miltsen, How Well Can States Enforce Their Environmental Laws When The Polluter Is the
,United States Government, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 123, 124 (1986).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). 21 Once the EPA establishes NAAQS
the states must submit a State Implementation Plan (SIP) which details
how the state will achieve the NAAQS for each pollutant for which the
EPA has established a standard.22 The SIP must contain emission limits
for major stationary sources of pollution (i.e. large factories), time tables
for achieving those limits, adequate enforcement provisions and other
provisions which this section requires. 23 If the SIP meets all statutory
requirements, then the EPA must approve it.24 While the states set emis-
sion limits for existing major stationary sources, the EPA sets nationally
uniform emission limits for mobile sources, 25 new stationary sources26
and toxics. 27 The states have primary enforcement authority under the
Act and the EPA will step in if a state fails to enforce its SIP
adequately. 28
The CWA relies primarily on nationally uniform effluent limits29
rather than ambient standards to control pollution.3o The EPA
prescribes the effluent limitations.3 The Act requires any person3 2 dis-
charging pollutants that will affect the navigable waters of the United
States to obtain a permit before doing so. 33 The Act allows either the
EPA or the individual state to administer and enforce this permit system,
referred to as the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES).3 4 Although the EPA suspends its permit program when it
approves a state program, the EPA still retains the power to review all
21. 42 U.S.C. § 7409. Ambient standards measure the concentration of a pollutant in a given
quantity of air. The NAAQS set a maximum concentration limit (ambient standards) for all pollu-
tants which the EPA finds dangerous to public health.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
23. An emission limit is a limit on the amount of pollutants a source can expel during a given
period of time. States use permit systems to control and enforce emission limits from major station-
ary sources.
24. Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 7521. For example, cars and trucks.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7411. For example, a factory built after the promulgation of a regulation re-
garding new sources would have to comply with that regulation.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 7412. Toxics are those pollutants for which no NAAQS applies, but which
cause or contribute to an increase in mortality or morbidity.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
29. Effluents are the discharges from factory pipes into water and are comparable to the emis-
sions of smokestacks into the air. Effluent limits are analogous to emission limits and refer to the
amount of polluted water a source may discharge into a given body of water over a given period of
time. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. The CWA defines person as "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State,
municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
34. The CWA 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) allows the EPA to administer the NPDES permit program.
Section 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) allows the states to administer their own NPDES program for
waters within their borders.
[Vol. 65:581
WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE
state permit decisions at the EPA's option. 35 Like the CAA, the CWA
requires the federal government to set standards for new sources 36 and
toxics. 37
RCRA controls solid waste disposal using both a cradle to grave
manifest system to track solid waste38 and technology requirements on
disposal sites where it is dumped.39 The Act uses a permit system to
insure that disposal sites meet federal or more stringent state standards. 40
RCRA divides waste into two categories, hazardous and nonhazardous.
Hazardous wastes are defined as those wastes which pose a risk to human
health because of their concentrations, quantity, or physical, chemical, or
infectious characteristics.41 RCRA allows a state to enact its own permit
program in lieu of the federal program if the state's program is equivalent
and consistent with the federal program and if the state's program pro-
vides for adequate enforcement. 42
B. Enforcement
All three Acts have similar enforcement provisions for polluters
who violate them.43 The Acts authorize progressively increasing enforce-
ment mechanisms from compliance orders to criminal penalties. 44 The
EPA or state agency has several options upon uncovering a violation of
the Acts. The agency can promulgate an administrative compliance or-
der requiring a polluter to comply with the law by a specified date.45 The
agency can then seek civil penalties for violations that occur after that
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1).
38. See Skillern, Constitutional and Statutory Issues of Federalism in the Development of Energy
Resources, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 533, 594 (1984). The cradle to grave manifest system re-
quires that paperwork identify every entity who has had control of hazardous waste from the point
of its generation to the point of its disposal. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o). The technological requirements include such safeguards as double
liners under the landfill, a ground water monitoring system to detect leaks, and a leachate collection
system to collect any liquids that do escape from the landfill. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 6926.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b).
43. The enforcement sections of the environmental statutes under discussion include 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319, 42 U.S.C. § 7413, and 42 U.S.C. § 6928. Of the enforcement options, civil penalties are most
important because otherwise violators would have a free period of noncompliance without penalty
between the time of the violation and the issuing of a court order. Only civil penalties act to discour-
age polluters' behavior without a government suit. Because of the record of federal noncompliance
to date the only effective means to ensure federal compliance is to allow the states to impose civil
penalties for violations of pollution laws. Brief for Plaintiffs, Ohio v. Department of Energy, 689 F.
Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
44. See supra note 43.
45. ANDERSON, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 433 (1984).
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date.4 The agency can also proceed in federal district court and ask for
injunctive relief or civil penalties against a violator.47 Moreover, the
EPA can seek sanctions from the court if the violator fails to comply
with an injunction. The most effective tool of government enforcement is
the civil penalty. 48 The three statutes authorize penalties for each day of
violation.49 Except for the CAA, the Acts provide for criminal penalties
of fines and jail terms for those who knowingly violate them; the CWA
also provides criminal penalties for negligent violators.50
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In 1976 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases, Hancock
v. Train 51 and United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Re-
sources Control Board,52 to resolve a conflict among the circuits regard-
ing whether the CAA and CWA required federal facilities to apply for
state permits before discharging pollutants. Hancock involved the inter-
pretation of the sovereign immunity waiver in the CAA. United States
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board involved
the CWA. In both cases the Court had to decide whether the sovereign
immunity waivers in each Act allowed states to enforce the Act against
federally owned facilities. In both cases the Court held that the Acts did
not waive sovereign immunity with regard to state enforcement against
federal facilities.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 325.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d); 42 U.S.C. 6928(a)(3).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d). The CAA has no provisions for criminal
penalties.
51. 426 U.S. 167 (1976). At the time of the decision, the first sentence of the waiver read:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judi-
cial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facil-
ity, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge of air
pollutants, shall comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements respecting
control and abatement of air pollution to the same extent that any person is subject to such
requirements.
426 U. S. at 182 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1857(f) (1976) [current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1982 &
Supp. V 1987)]). The waiver allowed the President to exempt a facility from such compliance. Id.
52. 426 U.S. 200 (1976). United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Con-
trol Bd. involved the sovereign immunity waiver in the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1323. At the time of
decision, that waiver read:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility,
or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge or runoff of
pollutants shall comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements respecting
control and abatement of pollution to the same extent that any person is subject to such
requirements, including the payment of reasonable service charges.
426 U.S. at 211-12 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1323).
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A. Hancock v. Train
The issue in Hancock was whether Congress intended that the en-
forcement mechanisms of federally approved SIPs, such as permit sys-
tems, be available to the states to enforce federal compliance with state
SIPs. 3 As stated previously,54 a state may regulate pollution sources
within its borders if it receives EPA approval of its SIP. Kentucky ap-
plied to the EPA for this permission in February, 1972. 55 The EPA ap-
proved Kentucky's SIP the following May.56 The SIP required all air
pollution sources to obtain a permit before emitting pollutants into the
air.57 To obtain a permit, a source had to supply the state with informa-
tion to ensure that the state could meet NAAQS if it granted the permit.
The source also had to provide the state with information so it could
impose necessary restrictions on the permit.5 8
Consistent with its EPA approved SIP Kentucky requested that fed-
eral facilities within its borders apply for permits. 59 Kentucky's position
was that federal facilities had to comply with the permit requirements
because of the sovereign immunity waiver in section 11860 of the CAA.
Section 118 of the act required federal facilities to comply with "Federal,
State, interstate, and local requirements respecting control and abate-
ment of air pollution to the same extent that any person is subject to such
requirements. ' 61 When Kentucky requested the federal facilities within
its borders62 to apply for permits, the federal facilities refused to com-
ply.63 However, the facilities offered or did supply the information that
the permit applications sought to obtain.64 Not satisfied with this re-
sponse, Hancock, Kentucky's Attorney General, sued the EPA and its
Administrator, Train.
Kentucky had a twofold claim. First, it argued that federal facilities
53. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 183.
54. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
55. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 172.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 173.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 174. Federal facilities included army facilities, facilities owned by the Tennessee
Valley Authority, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Id.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(f); see supra note 51.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(f)(1976) [current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)].
62. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 174.
63. Id.
64. Id. EPA sent letters to the federal facilities involved stating EPA policy. According to the
Regional Administrator this policy interpreted § 118 to require "Federal facilities to meet state air
quality standards and emissions limitations and to comply with deadlines established in the ap-
proved state air implementation plans." Id. at 175. However, the EPA stated that § 118 did not
require federal facilities to apply for state operating permits although the EPA did encourage federal
facilities to provide states with requested information. Id.
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had to comply with the information reporting requirements of the state's
permit program. 65 Second, Kentucky claimed that the facilities could
not operate without applying for and receiving a state permit. 66 The
EPA maintained that federal facilities did not have to apply for or re-
ceive permits to operate. 67 The EPA argued that section 118 merely re-
quired federal facilities to comply with state emission standards, not state
permit requirements. 6 The facilities supplied the requested information
as a matter of EPA policy, not as a matter of federal or state law.69
The Supreme Court analyzed the facts in Hancock using the federal
supremacy model first discussed in McCulloch v. Maryland.70 The Court
based its analysis on the supremacy clause 7' of the Constitution and the
plenary powers clause,72 authorizing exclusive congressional regulation
over all places purchased by Congress with the consent of the state legis-
lature. The Court assumed that federal facilities had the right to operate
in a state free of state regulation so long as Congress did not declare the
facility subject to state regulation.73 Because of the fundamental impor-
tance of federal sovereign immunity from state regulation, the Court held
that only a "clear and unambiguous" waiver of sovereign immunity by
Congress would permit state regulation. 74 Having decided the rule, the
Court proceeded to determine whether Congress clearly and unambigu-
ously waived sovereign immunity to state regulation in the CAA.
To determine whether the Act waived sovereign immunity with re-
gard to state enforcement devices such as permits, the Court proposed a
three step analysis. First, it examined section 118 on its face. Second,
the Court looked at the CAA as a whole to determine whether the re-
quirements to which Congress waived sovereign immunity included per-
mit requirements. Finally, the Court reviewed the legislative history of
the CAA to find whether Congress intended to waive sovereign immu-
65. Id. at 172-73.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 174.
68. Id. at 175.
69. Id.
70. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). This Court's reasoning relates directly back to the U.S.
Supreme Court's reasoning in McCulloch, in which the Supreme Court held that Maryland could
not tax the National Bank because the tax interfered with the operation of the bank in violation of
the supremacy clause. The Court in McCulloch reasoned that by using oppressive taxation a state
could prevent the operation of a federal entity and thus frustrate the will of the majority. See supra
note 7.
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
73. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 179.
74. Id.
[Vol. 65:581
WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE
nity with regard to state enforcement requirements such as permits. 75
1. Facial Analysis of Section 118 of the CAA
In full the CAA's sovereign immunity waiver read:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches of the Federal government (1) having juris-
diction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity
resulting, or which may result, in the discharge of air pollutants, shall
comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements respect-
ing control and abatement of air pollution to the same extent that any
person is subject to such requirements. 76
The waiver also authorized the President to exempt a facility from com-
pliance with a requirement if it were in the paramount interests of the
United States to do so.77 Kentucky argued that Congress granted it the
power to enforce permits because the permit system was a "state law
requirement," implementing federal requirements in the CAA, "respect-
ing control and abatement of air pollution. ''7  Further, Kentucky
stressed that without authority to enforce CAA requirements at federal
facilities, those facilities would not exercise their duty to comply with the
substantive requirements of the CAA.79
Although Kentucky's analysis sounded logical, the Court rejected it.
Because section 118 merely required federal facilities to comply with "re-
quirements" regarding pollution control, instead of "all requirements"
regarding pollution control, the Court held that section 118 on its face
did not clearly and unambiguously waive sovereign immunity with re-
gard to enforcement requirements in Kentucky's SIP.80 The full lan-
guage of the Court's reasoning bears repeating because of the strict
standard of interpretation it sets out:
Although the language of this provision is notable for what it states in
comparison with its predecessor, it is also notable for what it does not
state. It does not provide that federal installations "shall comply with
all federal, state, interstate, and local requirements to the same extent
as any other person." Nor does it state that federal installations "shall
comply with all requirements of the applicable state implementation
plan." Section 118 states only to what extent-the same as any per-
son-federal installations must comply with applicable state require-
ments; it does not identify the applicable requirements. . . .Given
agreement that § 118 makes it the duty of federal facilities to comply
75. Id. at 180.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(f)(1976) [transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)].
77. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 172.
78. Id. at 183.
79. Id. at 184.
80. Id. at 182.
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with state-established air quality and emission standards, the question
is. . . "whether Congress intended that the enforcement mechanisms
of federally approved state implementation plans, in this case permit
systems would be" available to the States to enforce that duty [empha-
sis in original].8 1
This statement illustrates the great lengths that the Court will travel to
limit a statute's waiver of sovereign immunity. First, the Court decided
that Congress meant to limit the state requirements to which federal fa-
cilities were subject because Congress did not explicitly subject federal
facilities to "all" requirements. This reading strains the imagination be-
cause Congress did not include words of limitation in the waiver. Since
Congress did not add words of limitation to the waiver, it is unnatural for
the Court to conclude that Congress meant to imply them.
Almost anticipating this criticism, the Court added its own words of
limitation to the language of the waiver to justify its reading. In the
second part of the quote, the Court adds ambiguity to the waiver by not-
ing that federal facilities must comply with "applicable" requirements.
The Court uses this language to justify a review of the statute as a whole
to determine what Congress meant by applicable requirements. Unfortu-
nately, section 118 makes no mention of applicable requirements.8 2 One
can only conclude that the Court went out of its way to avoid a natural
reading of the waiver, first by requiring the explicit use of a word already
implicit in the waiver's language and then by reading words of limitation
into the act.
Kentucky also argued that the language making federal facilities
comply with state requirements to the same extent as any person implied
that federal facilities must comply with any requirement with which a
person would have to comply.8 3 If Kentucky required any other person
in the state to apply for a permit then, a natural reading of section 118
indicates that federal facilities must also apply for permits. The Court
rejected this argument also. The Court read this language to mean that
federal facilities would have to achieve the same levels of performance as
nonfederal sources, not that state enforcement mechanisms would apply
to federal facilities.8 4 The Court looked to other sections of the CAA to
81. Id. at 182-83 (quoting Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir. 1974)).
82. The Court may have gotten the word "applicable" from the House of Representatives' draft
of the sovereign immunity waiver. The House version would: "direct Federal agencies in the execu-
tive, legislative and judicial branches to comply with the applicable Federal, state, interstate, and
local emission standards." H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5370 (emphasis added). See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text for
a more detailed discussion of the legislative history.
83. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 183.
84. Id.
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determine that the CAA did not clearly and unambiguously waive sover-
eign immunity with regard to state permit requirements.
2. Analysis of the Act as a Whole
Because the Court found that section 118 did not adequately define
"requirements," the Court turned to the CAA as a whole to search for
the meaning of the word. The Court found that Congress intended to
waive sovereign immunity only with respect to emission standards and
compliance schedules and not administrative and enforcement stan-
dards.8 5 First, the Court analyzed section 110(a)(2)8 6 which describes
what the state needed to have in its SIP before obtaining EPA approval.
This section included such items as compliance schedules and emission
standards. The Court did not find an adequate enforcement program as
one of those requirements. 87 The Court reasoned that although Ken-
tucky chose to enforce its SIP requirements with a permit program, sec-
tion 110, describing SIPs, did not require states to implement a permit
program to enforce those requirements. 88 According to the Court, Con-
gress' failure to mandate a permit program to enforce pollution laws im-
plied that Congress did not intend to waive sovereign immunity with
regard to enforcement requirements. 89
The Court found added support for this rationale in other parts of
section 110. Section 1 I0(e) provided for deadline waivers for sources
that could not meet emission limitation "requirements" of the SIP. 90
Another section, 110(f), allowed for a one year postponement of the ap-
plication of "requirements" to sources necessary for public health or na-
tional security.91 Based upon a plain reading of section 110 the Court
noted that the only requirements these sections could refer to were emis-
sion limitation requirements. 92 The Court introduced a dichotomy be-
tween requirements such as emission standards and compliance
schedules which work to actually reduce air pollution and administrative
and enforcement requirements, provisions which states use to establish
and enforce those requirements. 93 The requirements in this dichotomy
85. Id. at 187.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2).
87. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 184.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 185.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(e).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f).
92. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 187.
93. Id. at 185-86.
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are also referred to as substantive and procedural requirements
respectively.
In using section 110 to distinguish substantive from procedural re-
quirements, the Court made a category mistake by confusing the require-
ments on states and the requirements of states. Section 110 lists the
minimum requirements that a state SIP must meet to obtain EPA ap-
proval. It does not refer to the requirements that states can impose on
sources. Section 118 refers to requirements of states imposed on sources
in the states. If Congress had meant to limit sovereign immunity to the
requirements of section 110 it would not have included the waiver of
"local" requirements in section 118. Nowhere does section 110 mention
any requirements that localities may (or must) impose, yet section 118
waives sovereign immunity with regard to local requirements.
Moreover, the Court's analysis indicates that it suffers from myopia
as well as category confusion. Had the Court reviewed section 1 10(a)(1)
as carefully as it reviewed section 1 10(a)(2) it would have found that
Congress did indeed require SIPs to contain adequate enforcement provi-
sions. Congress realized that states could not attain and maintain
NAAQS without an adequate enforcement program. Section 1 10(a)(1)
requires, "[e]ach State shall... adopt and submit to the Administrator
... a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforce-
ment of [NAAQS]. ''94 Under Section 1 10(a)(1) a SIP without adequate
enforcement provisions would be incomplete. Thus, the Court's analysis
is flawed because Congress did explicitly require SIPs to have an ade-
quate enforcement program.
Other sections of 1 10(a)(2) do not lend themselves to the Court's
narrow reading. Section 1 10(a)(2)(B) requires the state SIP to include
"emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with
such limitations, and such other measures as may be necessary to insure
attainment and maintenance of such primary or secondary standard[s],
including, but not limited to, land use and transportation controls .... "95
This section could be read to include enforcement requirements in a SIP.
Section 1 10(a)(2)(F) requires the state to have "adequate ... authority to
carry out [its] implementation plan."'96 Reading along with section
1 10(a)(1) one can see that Congress intended to make enforcement pro-
grams an integral part of the SIP. Since Congress meant enforcement
programs to be part of the SIP, by the Court's own logic, section 118
94. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
95. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(B).
96. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(F).
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should have waived sovereign immunity with regard to Kentucky's en-
forcement program.
Other sections of the CAA further illustrate the Court's limited and
arbitrary review of the Act as a whole. Kentucky argued that section
116 of the CAA defined emission limits as only one type of requirement,
enforcement being the other type of requirement. Section 11697 stated,
"nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State...
to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of
air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of
air pollution .... 98 This section illustrates that Congress did not intend
to make requirements synonymous with emission standards because it
separates requirements from emission limits. This section also supports a
broad reading of the sovereign immunity waiver because it states that
nothing in the CAA shall preclude states from enforcing those require-
ments. The Court refused to apply the section 116 definition of require-
ments to section 118, the sovereign immunity waiver, despite the fact
that part (2) contained the same language as the waiver.99 The Court
claimed that section 116 meant that the federal government had not pre-
empted state regulation, but held that section 116 did not have the "clear
and unambiguous authorization necessary to subject federal installations
and activities to state enforcement."'100
3. Legislative History
The legislative history of section 118 is brief. The House version of
section 118 required federal facilities to comply with emission stan-
dards.101 Further, the committee report states, "[i]n order to control air
pollution .. .the Secretary may establish classes of potential pollution
sources for which any Federal [facility] shall, before discharging any
matter into the air of the United States, obtain a permit from the Secre-
tary for such discharge .... .102 It seems that at least the House intended
to limit the states' ability to impose permit requirements on federal facili-
ties. First, the House version limited the actual waiver to emission stan-
97. 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
98. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 186 n.47.
99. 426 U.S. at 186. The Court noted that, "we are unable to draw from § 116 any support for
the position that Congress affirmatively declared that federal installations must secure state per-
mits." Id. This inability is striking since § 116 states that "nothing in this act shall preclude or deny
the right of any State... to adopt or enforce ... any requirement respecting control or abatement of
air pollution..." 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
100. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 186 n.47.
101. H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5370.
102. Id.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
dards. Second, the intent section stated that the House intended federal
facilities to obtain permits from the federal government, not the states.
However, Congress did not adopt the House version of the waiver. The
Senate version required federal facilities to comply with state require-
ments.10 3 The report stated that "[t]his section requires that Federal fa-
cilities meet the emission standards necessary to achieve ambient air
quality standards .... 104 The conference report stated that "[t]he House
bill and the Senate amendment declared that Federal departments and
agencies should comply with applicable standards of air quality and
emissions."' 0 5 Although the Court placed much emphasis on the lan-
guage limiting the waiver to applicable standards, it ignored the language
declaring that federal facilities "should comply" with these standards.
By declaring that federal facilities should comply with emissions stan-
dards, Congress did not preclude the waiver from including enforcement
requirements from the waiver. In fact, section 118 contained the broad
"requirements" language rather than the narrow "emission standards"
language. The Court misused the rules of statutory interpretation by
using legislative history to confuse language clear on its face rather than
by using it to clarify language unclear on its face. 106
B. United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources
Control Board
United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Con-
trol Board involved the sovereign immunity waiver in the CWA. The
CWA waiver had a similar history to the waiver in the CAA.10 7 When
Congress enacted the 1972 amendments, it worded the sovereign immu-
nity waiver to parallel the waiver in the CAA.10 8 Section 313 required
federal facilities to "comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local re-
quirements respecting control and abatement of pollution to the same
extent that any person is subject to such requirements."109 State Water
Resources Control Board involved the issue of whether the EPA had the
authority to refuse to approve the portion of a state's NPDES program
requiring permits from federal facilities. Although the facts in State
Water Resources Control Board were different from Hancock, the
103. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong. 2nd Sess. (1970)
104. Id.
105. CONF. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5381.
106. See infra notes 130 and 139 and accompanying text.
107. United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 212.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 52.
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Supreme Court narrowed the case down to the same issue: whether Con-
gress intended a permit to be among the requirements respecting the con-
trol and abatement of water pollution with which federal facilities must
comply. "10
The Court followed the same analysis as it did in Hancock to find
that the Act did not waive sovereign immunity with regard to permits.
Facially, the Court found no evidence that section 313 included state
NPDES permits within "requirements respecting the control and abate-
ment of pollution."' 1  Again the Court limited requirements to "applica-
ble" requirements even though no such language appeared in the
statute."1 2 The Court then decided that it had to look to the Act as a
whole to determine whether permits were an "applicable requirement,"
with which federal facilities must comply to the same extent as any
person.
In analyzing the Act as a whole, the Court should have had great
difficulty finding that the waiver in the CWA did not apply to permits
because unlike the CAA, the CWA explicitly required a permit program
to enforce effluent limitations." 3 However, the Court found the EPA's
review role in the state's permit program, coupled with the fact that the
Act did not even require states to develop NPDES programs, sufficient to
determine that Congress did not intend to waive sovereign immunity
with regard to state permit programs.'' 4 The Court did not find the
CWA's provision allowing states to operate an NPDES program in lieu
110. 426 U.S. at 200. The CAA primarily relies upon NAAQS to ensure clean air. At the time
the Supreme Court decided Hancock, permits were an optional measure that a state could use to
achieve compliance with NAAQS. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 184-85. The CWA relied upon a permit
system to ensure clean water and thus every entity that discharged pollutants into the waters of the
United States had to have a permit. Therefore federal facilities needed a permit under the CWA but
not under the CAA. Thus, the issue of whether a federally issued permit adequately conformed with
state law which required a state permit arose in United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water
Resources Control Bd. but not in Hancock.
California and Washington both sued the EPA. The EPA approved California's NPDES pro-
gram in 1973 except with regard to the right to issue permits to federal facilities. United States EPA
v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. 426 U.S. at 209. The EPA refused to ap-
prove Washington's application to permit federal facilities, because the EPA did not believe that it
had the authority to delegate the right to issue permits to federal facilities to any state. Id. Califor-
nia and Washington petitioned the court of appeals to review the EPA's decision arguing two points.
First, they argued that the CWA authorized states with approved permit programs to issue permits
to federal facilities. Id. at 210. Second, the states claimed that the Act did not give the EPA the
right to suspend state permitting authority only for nonfederal facilities. Id. The court of appeals
held that the CWA did require federal facilities to obtain state permits before discharging pollutants
even if the CAA did not. The Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals because it could not
find "clear and unambiguous" language waiving sovereign immunity in § 313. 426 U.S. at 202.
111. Id. at 213.
112. Id. at 212.
113. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
114. 426 U.S. at 213.
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of a federal enforcement program persuasive enough to find a waiver of
sovereign immunity with regard to permits. Again the Court made a
category mistake by failing to distinguish between what the CWA re-
quired of states and what the CWA required of facilities.
Further, the Court separated the state's right to impose stricter stan-
dards from its right to enforce those standards through a permit pro-
gram. The Court reasoned that since Congress did not require the states
to implement a permit program, it must have felt that the EPA could
adequately enforce a state's stricter standards, thus obviating the need for
state permitting authority. 115 This analysis is not consistent with the
Court's analysis in Hancock because the CWA expressly required states
that chose to operate their own NPDES program to use permits to en-
force effluent limits. 116 The Court mistakenly focused on the potential
role of the EPA rather than on the reality of Congressional intent as
illustrated by section 402 to have the states administer their own NPDES
programs.
Finally, the Court looked at the legislative history to determine that
requirements referred to effluent limitations, not permit requirements. 117
The Court reviewed both the Senate and House reports to determine that
requirements meant effluent limitations only. Further, the Court found
no support in the legislative history to warrant the all or nothing ap-
proach to EPA permitting approval."18 As in Hancock, the Court ad-
monished Congress to amend the Acts if it wanted to waive sovereign
immunity with regard to state permit programs. 119
In summary, the Court in these two decisions defined a strict rule to
determine whether Congress waived sovereign immunity with regard to
state regulation of federal facilities. Congress must first expressly waive
sovereign immunity, and it must also precisely define the parameters of
the waiver. 120 Hancock and State Water Resources Control Board indi-
cate that when Congress attempts to waive sovereign immunity in a stat-
ute the Supreme Court will jealously guard sovereign immunity using a
three step analysis. First, the Court will look at the section waiving sov-
ereign immunity. Second, it will analyze the act as a whole to see if the
115. United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at
213. The CWA gives the state the option of developing its own enforcement program or merely
developing standards and having the EPA enforce the state standards.
116. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
117. United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at
217.
118. Id. at 226.
119. Id. at 227-28.
120, Id.
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act requires a waiver of sovereign immunity. Third, the Court will ana-
lyze the legislative history to determine congressional intent.
C. The Cases Taken Together
The Court used inconsistent reasoning in Hancock and United
States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board to
support the result it desired in each case. The CAA required states to
develop a plan (including enforcement provisions), but the Act did not
require states to use a permit system to enforce the plan. The CWA re-
quired states to operate a permit system, but did not mandate a compre-
hensive plan, instead relying mostly on federally mandated requirements
(according to the Court). 21 Logically, then, the Court's reasoning in
each case cannot consistently result in a finding of no waiver with regard
to permits in both cases. Either the Court must uphold the waiver in the
CWA because it specifically requires states to administer permit pro-
grams, or it must uphold the waiver in the CAA because the standards in
the CAA are state developed. Logically, the Court should not have been
able to reason away the waivers in both the CAA and the CWA.
One must wonder why the Court applied such an impossible stan-
dard to the sovereign immunity waivers in the CAA and CWA, especially
because subsequent history 122 indicates that Congress truly intended to
waive sovereign immunity with regard to enforcement requirements.
Clearly, the Court drew from the theory in McCulloch v. Maryland 123
that the power to tax is the power to destroy. 124 Applied to Hancock and
State Water Resources Control Board, the power to destroy could be
through the power to refuse to issue a permit to a federal facility. Thus,
a state could thwart the will of the nation unilaterally by refusing to
allow a facility to operate that people in the other forty-nine states
wanted to operate.
The power to destroy theory does not warrant support for three rea-
sons. First, the sovereign immunity waivers themselves allowed the Pres-
ident to exempt federal facilities from state and local requirements if it
were in the paramount interests of the United States. ' 25 In protecting the
paramount interest of the United States, the presidential exemption indi-
cates that Congress did wish to waive sovereign immunity to state re-
quirements including enforcement requirements for other federal
121. Id. at 214-15.
122. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
123. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
124. Id. at 327.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (CAA) and 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (CWA).
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facilities. Second, the historic noncompliance of federal facilities coupled
with Congress' desire for federal facilities to set a national example in
pollution control also supports a reading of the waiver to include en-
forcement requirements. 126
The third reason to disavow the Court's logic is that federal facilities
had to comply with state emission/effluent standards regardless of
whether they were stricter than federal standards. 127 Thus, the EPA
* could not issue an NPDES permit that violated state standards. Theoret-
ically the place where enforcement power lies should not affect whether a
federal facility could operate because the EPA could not legally issue a
permit that violated state standards. The only plausible reason that the
Court could have read the sovereign immunity waivers so strictly was to
give Congress a chance to rethink the desirability of a broad sovereign
immunity waiver.
Another reason the Court interpreted the waiver narrowly could be
due to the traditional deference that a court will show to an agency's
interpretation of the statute it administers. Courts defer because agencies
develop expertise in the statutes they administer, In both Hancock and
United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Board the EPA maintained that the sovereign immunity waivers in the
CAA and CWA did not waive sovereign immunity with regard to en-
forcement requirements. For example, in United States EPA v. Califor-
nia ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, the EPA maintained
that the waiver of sovereign immunity to service charges meant charges
for sewage treatment, not charges for permits. 128 The Court accepted the
EPA's interpretation because it was not an "unreasonable construc-
tion." 129 The EPA position provided the Court with a rational reason to
interpret the waivers narrowly.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WAIVERS
Congress reacted strongly to the Court's decisions in Hancock and
United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Board because Congress considered the sovereign immunity waivers in
the CAA and CWA broad enough to require federal facilities to comply
with state permitting authority. 130 Immediately after the Court handed
126. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (CAA), 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (CWA).
128. United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at
217.
129. Id.
130. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
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down these decisions, Congress busied itself with amending the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, which became RCRA. 131 Congress later amended
the CAA and CWA. These Acts clearly waive sovereign immunity with
regard to permits. The issue today is whether these three Acts waive
sovereign immunity with regard to enforcement requirements, especially
civil penalties, against federal facilities that violate those permits. The
scope of these waivers is still at issue because many courts defer to the
"clear and unambiguous" standard of the Supreme Court rather than to
the obvious intent of Congress (especially in light of the post-Hancock
amendments) in interpreting the sovereign immunity waivers in the pol-
lution statutes.
Cases subsequent to 1976 illustrate the conflict between the Court's
reasoning in Hancock and United States EPA v. California ex rel. State
Water Resources Control Board and Congress' reaction to those cases.
For example, in McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger
(MESS) 132 the district court held that if any doubt about the meaning of
the statute exists, the court will not find a waiver.133 To emphasize its
point the court stated that a waiver "cannot be implied,.. . assumed,...
[or] based upon speculation, surmise or conjecture."' 134 Other courts
have found that the waivers do meet Supreme Court standards. 35 The
next sections will analyze the CAA, CWA and RCRA and show that the
sovereign immunity waivers in each act meet even the clear and unam-
biguous requirements of the Supreme Court.
A. CAA Waiver
No statute waives sovereign immunity to state enforcement proce-
dures more clearly than the CAA. The waiver requires federal facilities
to be subject to and comply with:
all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative au-
thority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abate-
ADMIN. NEWS 1276, S.REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4392.
131. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
132. 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986). The facts preceding MESS illustrate the danger of
allowing the military to police itself. In 1979 the Air Force found that drinking water wells on base
were contaminated but failed to notify the California Department of Health. Pollack and Shulman,
supra note 2, at 28. Then, the Air Force withheld a report detailing how the contaminants had
spread to wells off base until the state threatened legal action. Id. "Even then, cleanup lagged until
the base was sharply criticized by the General Accounting Office and pressure was applied by angry
members of Congress, state and local politicians and neighbors." Id. Today McClellan is ranked
among the hundred worst sites on the Superfund list. Id.
133. MESS, 655 F. Supp. at 602-03.
134. Id.
135. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760.
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ment of air pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as
any nongovernmental entity. The preceding sentence shall apply (A)
to any requirement whether substantive or procedural (including any
recordkeeping or reporting requirement, any requirement respecting
permits and any other requirement whatsoever), (B) to the exercise of
any Federal, State, or local administrative authority, and (C) to any
process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local
courts or in any other manner.' 36
The Hancock decision angered Congress because it thought that section
118 of the act had been written clearly enough to waive sovereign immu-
nity with regard to all requirements, including permits. 37 Congress felt
that section 118 obviously waived sovereign immunity to procedural re-
quirements because it saw procedural requirements and sanctions "inci-
dental to implementation and enforcement of the substantive
requirements."'' 38 Thus, Congress wrote a sovereign immunity waiver
into the CAA which clearly and unambiguously waived sovereign immu-
nity to everything.
A facial analysis reveals the clear and unambiguous intent of Con-
gress. The first part of the waiver answered the Supreme Court's first
problem with reading the old section 118 by putting an "all" in front of
requirements. Further, Congress explicitly stated that the waiver applied
to all "requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions
respecting the control and abatement of air pollution .... ,39 This sen-
tence clearly extends the requirements involved beyond the limits of
emission standards imposed by the Court in the old waiver. First, the
application of the waiver to "all requirements" rebuffs the Supreme
Court's attempt to create a dichotomy between substantive and proce-
dural requirements. Second, the addition of "administrative authority
136. 42 U.S.C. § 7418. The waiver reads:
[e]ach department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility,
or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge of air pollu-
tants, and each officer, agent, or employee thereof, shall be subject to and comply with, all
Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and process
and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of air pollution in the same manner,
and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. The preceding sentence shall apply
(A) to any requirement whether substantive or procedural (including any recordkeeping or
reporting requirement, any requirement respecting permits and any other requirement
whatsoever), (B) to the exercise of any Federal, State, or local administrative authority,
and (C) to any process and sanction whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or
in any other manner.
Id.
137. See supra note 119.
138. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 197-98, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1276.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 7418.
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and process and sanctions" removes any doubt regarding what the
waiver covers.
Congress also made federal facilities "subject to" state and local re-
quirements "in the same manner" as well as to the same extent as any
person.140 The old section 118 merely mandated federal compliance with
state and local pollution requirements to the same extent as any person.
These two additions were important because in both Hancock and United
States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board the
Court interpreted the "same extent as any person" language merely to
require federal facility compliance with state emission/effluent limits. 14'
The phrases making federal facilities subject to state requirements in the
same manner as any person allows states to impose penalties on federal
facilities in the same manner as private citizens who violate state limits.
As if the first sentence were not enough, Congress added subsections
(A), (B), and (C), which essentially repeated and amplified the first part.
Subsection (A) defined substantive and procedural requirements with a
parenthetical specifically designed to overturn Hancock. The parentheti-
cal included recordkeeping, reporting, and permit requirements within
the waiver as well as "any other requirement whatsoever."'' 4 2 Subsection
(C) stressed that the waiver applied to sanctions regardless of what body
imposed them. 143 Subsection (B) allowed for enforcement by any federal,
state, or local authority. Subsections (A), (B), and (C) clearly enable any
level of government to enforce any requirement against any federal
facility.
An analysis of the Act as a whole reveals modifications made in
response to Hancock. In response to the Supreme Court's reasoning that
permits were not a required part of a state's SIP, Congress required a
state SIP to contain a permit program before the EPA could approve
it.' 44 Congress clearly stated that the purpose of the program was for
enforcement. 14 5 Congress also amended section 302146 to include the
United States and all of its instrumentalities within the definition of a
person. Obviously Congress wanted to make the waiver "air tight," and
it did.
140. See supra note 135.
141. See United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at
212. "Taken alone, § 313 like § 118 of the Clean Air Act, states only to what extent-the same as
any person-federal installations must comply with applicable state requirements." Id.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a)(2)(A).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a)(2)(C).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (1982).
145. Id.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857(h)(8) (1976)).
1989]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
In the legislative history, Congress declared immediately that it in-
tended the new sovereign immunity waiver to overturn Hancock.1 47
Congress did distinguish between requirements and sanctions. It defined
requirements as actions federal agencies must take to comply with fed-
eral, state and local law and sanctions as actions which states could take
in response to a federal agency's violation of state law. 148 However, this
distinction makes the waiver even stronger.
Two courts have interpreted the amended CAA sovereign immunity
waiver, and both have found that it waives sovereign immunity with re-
gard to state enforcement actions. 149 These courts looked to the legisla-
tive history of the 1977 Amendments and determined that Congress
amended the waiver in the CAA for the purpose of overturning Han-
cock.150 They also found that the sovereign immunity waiver itself and
the Act as a whole, as discussed above, demonstrated a clear and unam-
biguous waiver with regard to state imposed civil penalties on federal
facilities.
B. CWA
The amended sovereign immunity waiver (section 313) of the CWA
begins with the same strong language as the CAA. The waiver reads in
relevant part:
[e]ach department, agency, or instrumentality... [of the] Federal
government . . . shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal,
State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and
process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water
pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongov-
ernmental entity including the payment of reasonable service charges.
The preceding sentence shall apply (A) to any requirement whether
substantive or procedural (including any recordkeeping or reporting
requirement, any requirement respecting permits and any other re-
quirement, whatsoever), (B) to the exercise of any Federal, State, or
local administrative authority, and (C) to any process and sanction,
whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any other
manner... the United States shall be liable only for those civil penal-
ties arising under federal law or imposed by a State or local court to
enforce an order or the process of such court.' 51
147. H. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 197-98, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1278.
148. Id.
149. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21210 (S.D.
Ohio 1987), and Alabama ex rel. Graddick v. Veterans Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Ala.
1986).
150. 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21211.
151. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982).
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The CWA sovereign immunity waiver broadens the liability of federal
facilities to state enforcement actions in much the same manner as the
CAA. In fact the waiver was amended in committee to parallel the
waiver in the CAA.152 The CWA waives immunity for "all" require-
ments, federal, state, or local, judicial, or administrative, regardless of
whether the body enforcing them is federal, state, or local.
However, the waiver contains an additional sentence not found in
the CAA waiver which states that "the United States shall be liable only
for those civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a state
or local court to enforce an order or process of such a court."1 53 This
additional sentence has been read by some courts 54 to limit the state's
authority to impose civil penalties on federal facilities violating state is-
sued NPDES permits. The conference report on section 313 undercuts
any reading of the additional sentence that limits the state's power to
impose civil penalties on federal facilities. The report notes that the en-
acted waiver was specifically "revised to conform with a comparable pro-
vision in the Clean Air Act... with the additional requirement that any
action or other judicial proceeding to which this provision applies may be
removed by any Federal ... instrumentality ... to the appropriate dis-
trict court of the United States."1 55 The additional provision to which
the report refers must be the provision requiring civil penalties to be lev-
ied under federal law-because this is the only difference between the two
waivers and because a penalty imposed under federal law allows the fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over the matter.156
The CWA as a whole provides further evidence that violations of
state issued permits violate federal law. Two sections of the CWA make
the discharge of any pollutant in violation of a permit a violation of fed-
eral law regardless of whether the state or EPA has issued the permit.
Section 301(a) 157 makes the discharge of pollutants in violation of a per-
152. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 93, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4468.
153. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
154. See infra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
155. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 830 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4468. The Senate report destroys any doubt about the application of any require-
ment, including civil penalties, that states may impose on federal facilities. The report states:
The act has been amended to indicate unequivocally that all Federal facilities and activities
are subject to all provisions of State and local pollution laws. Though this was the intent of
the Congress in passing the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, the
Supreme Court, encouraged by Federal agencies, has misconstrued the original intent.
S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4392.
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982).
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mit issued under section 402158 unlawful. Section 402(k)15 9 deems com-
pliance with permits issued under section 402 as "compliance, for
purposes of sections 1319 and 1365 of this title, and with sections 1311,
1312, 1316, and 1343 of this title .... "160 Thus a violation of a permit
indicates a violation of one or more of these sections which are all under
federal law. Sections 301 and 402(k) read together especially support the
argument that all permit violations arise under federal law because 301
makes violation of a 402 permit a violation of federal law and 402(k)
makes a permit violation a violation of 301 regardless of whether the
EPA or the state issued the permit.
The CWA as a whole also authorizes state imposed civil penalties for
violations of state issued permit requirements. Section 402(b)(7)161 re-
quires a state permit program to contain provisions for civil and criminal
penalties to remedy permit or permit program violations. Section
309(a)(2) indicates that Congress preferred states to enforce their own
programs by giving the Administrator power to enforce state issued per-
mits whenever the Administrator "finds that violations of permit condi-
tions or limitations ... are so widespread that such violations appear to
result from a failure of the State to enforce ... permit conditions effec-
tively."' 62 Section 309(d)163 authorizes civil penalties for permit viola-
tions whether the Administrator or the state issued the permit. Thus,
when federal facilities violate state issued permits they violate federal law
and the CWA authorizes states to impose civil penalties to remedy those
violations.
The three cases interpreting the sovereign immunity section of the
CWA have come out on both sides of the issue. Basically the act's sover-
eign immunity waiver involves a conflict between federal courts in the
Ninth Circuit, McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger
158. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V 1987). Section 402(a)
defines the requirements for federal permit programs and section 402(b) defines the requirements for
state permit programs. Thus a federal facility discharging in violation of a state issued permit, vio-
lates § 301(a) of the CWA. Regardless of the status of the state permit, the § 301(a) violation is a
violation of federal law. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
159. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k).
160. Section 1311 (1982), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. V 1987) makes illegal all dis-
charges without a permit and discharges in violation of a permit. Section 1319 defines the CWA's
enforcement procedures. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. V 1987).
Section 1312 defines ambient water quality standards. Section 1316 defines new source standards.
33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1982), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. V 1987). Section 1343 establishes
criteria for ocean discharge. 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7).
162. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(2).
163. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
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(MESS),t64 and California v. United States Department of the Navyt6 5
and a federal district court in Ohio, Ohio v. United States Department of
Energy.166 One other court interpreted the waiver narrowly, Kelley v.
United States,t67 but did so on grounds not relevant here. 168 The differ-
ence in the language between the CAA waiver and the CWA led the
MESS court and the court in California v. United States Department of
the Navy to a narrow interpretation of the waiver. The similarities led
the Ohio v. United States Department of Energy court to a broad interpre-
tation of the waiver.
The court in MESS focused on the language limiting the sovereign
immunity waiver to "civil penalties arising under Federal law . . .or
imposed by a state or local court to enforce an order or the process of
such court."' 69 The court labeled this section a "compilation of ambigu-
ity" because of its vague and contradictory wording.170 Although the
conference report stated that Congress intended this provision to mirror
the waiver in the CAA, the MESS court refused to do so.t 7' Because the
statute was not clear on its face and because it had a limited legislative
history, the court held that section 313 did not meet the clear and unam-
biguous standard that the Supreme Court requires to find a waiver of
sovereign immunity. 72
In California v. United States Department of the Navy, the Ninth
Circuit relied on section 402(b)'s language that state permit systems arise
under state law. 173 The relevant part of section 402(b) states:
At any time after the promulgation of the guidelines required by sub-
section (i)(2) of section 1314 of this title, the Governor of each State
desiring to administer its own permit program ... may submit to the
Administrator a full and complete description of the program it pro-
poses to establish and administer under State law or under an inter-
state compact. 174
164. 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
165. 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988).
166. 689 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
167. 618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
168. Id. The district court also interpreted the sovereign immunity waiver of the CWA. How-
ever, that court decided the case on the basis of the definition of requirements in Hancock and
United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. See supra notes 96-97 and
accompanying text. Thus, the court limited requirements to objective standards. Unfortunately, the
court failed to recognize that the 1977 Amendments added all procedural requirements as well as
substantive requirements to the list of state laws to which the federal government waived sovereign
immunity.
169. 655 F. Supp. at 604.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 604-05.
172. Id. at 605.
173. 845 F.2d at 225.
174. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
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California attempted to justify its imposition of civil penalties for two
reasons. First, the state tried to justify imposing the penalties because
section 402(b)(7) mandates that state permit programs have adequate en-
forcement authority. 75 The second reason that the state advanced was
that the violations of the permit were violations of federal law because
the EPA approved California's program. 1 76 The court of appeals re-
jected these arguments because it found that Congress intended state per-
mit programs to be operated in lieu of federal programs and not as
delegations of federal authority. 177 The court of appeals refused to find a
violation of federal law under the state's permit program.
In Ohio v. United States Department of Energy, the court also fo-
cused on the section limiting civil penalties to those arising under federal
law.' 78 The court held that the state-imposed civil penalties arose under
federal law because the NPDES system resulted in the state enforcing
federal law. 179 The court rejected the MESS court's contention that even
if the state law mirrored the federal law word for word a violation still
would not arise under federal law.180 The court had two reasons for
holding that the DOE's violation arose under federal law. First, the
court noted that section 402 required states to have an adequate enforce-
ment program in order to receive permitting authority from the EPA. 18 1
Second, the court found that since compliance with a state NPDES per-
mit demonstrated compliance with the CWA, a violation of the state's
NPDES permit constituted a violation of the CWA, a federal law.' 82
Thus, the court found that the sovereign immunity waiver applied to fed-
eral facilities that violated state permits.
The Supreme Court's analysis in United States EPA v. California ex
rel. State Water Resources Control Board 183 indicates that the court in
Ohio v. United States Department of Energy interpreted the waiver cor-
rectly. The Ohio v. United States Department of Energy court can find
support in the changes that Congress made in the CWA after United
States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board. In
United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Board, the Supreme Court found that the sovereign immunity waiver in
175. 845 F.2d at 225.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 689 F. Supp. at 766.
179. Id. at 767.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
[Vol. 65:581
WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE
the CWA did not encompass state permitting authority because the EPA
had final enforcement authority. 84 Sections 402(c) 85 and 309(a)(2) 186
indicate that Congress rewrote the CWA to respond to that fault. Sec-
tion 402(c) requires the Administrator to suspend the federal permit pro-
gram when he approves a state permit program. Section 309(a)(2)
authorizes federal enforcement in lieu of state enforcement only when the
state fails to enforce its permit program on a widespread basis. Thus, one
can see a conscious congressional effort to overturn United States EPA v.
California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board and make state
enforcement an integral part of the state operated NPDES program.
The text of the waiver and the CWA as a whole does not support the
decisions of the courts in MESS and California v. United States Depart-
ment of Navy. The waiver on its face is broad and despite the contention
of the court in MESS the legislative history clearly indicates that the
narrowing language in the waiver is for jurisdictional and not substantive
purposes. Even though section 402(b) states that each state administers
its permit program under state law, the Act as a whole clearly indicates
that a violation of a state issued permit violates several sections of federal
law. These courts have confused the government that administers the
permit program and the government whose laws are violated by infrac-
tions. Since the CWA clearly makes the violation of a state permit pro-
gram a violation of federal law, the reasoning of the courts in the Ninth
Circuit does not hold water.
C. R CRA
Congress enacted the RCRA sovereign immunity waiver1 87 in re-
sponse to the Supreme Court decisions in Hancock and United States
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, three
months after the Court decided those cases.1 88 A facial reading of sec-
tion 6001 reveals that Congress worded the waiver to parallel the waiver
of the CAA of 1970 and added language to respond to the Supreme
Court decision in Hancock. The waiver requires federal facilities to:
be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements, both substantive and procedural (including any require-
ment for permits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief
and such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce such re-
lief), respecting control and abatement of solid waste or hazardous
184. Id.
185. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1982), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (Supp. V 1987).
186. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(2).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1982).
188. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
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waste disposal in the same manner, and to the same extent, as any
person is subject to such requirements, including the payment of rea-
sonable service charges. 
189
Like the pre-Hancock section 118 of the CAA, the waiver required fed-
eral facilities to comply with federal, state, interstate and local require-
ments regarding the control and abatement of pollution to the same
extent as any person.' 90 However, the Act added modifiers to this lan-
guage. First, Congress added that the United States shall "be subject to"
as well as "comply with" the federal, state, and local requirements "in
the same manner" and to the "same extent" as any person.1 91 Second,
Congress expanded the definition of requirements to include "all require-
ments, both substantive and procedural, (including any requirements for
permits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanc-
tions as may be imposed by a court to enforce such relief)."' 92
These additions are a direct response to the Supreme Court's chal-
lenge to Congress to draft a waiver that truly waives the sovereign immu-
nity of federal facilities.193 The addition of "all" to modify requirements
answered the Supreme Court's concern in Hancock 194 regarding the re-
quirements to which the waiver referred. By waiving sovereign immu-
nity with regard to all requirements, the Court does not have to search
through the Act as a whole to find the requirements to which the waiver
refers. By further modifying requirements to include both substantive
and procedural requirements, Congress responded to the Court's dichot-
omy between substantive and procedural requirements. 195 The Court in-
cluded emission limits and compliance schedules in its definition of
substantive requirements, and enforcement requirements such as permits
in its definition of procedural requirements. 196 By waiving sovereign im-
189. 42 U.S.C. § 6961.
190. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 6961.
192. Id.
193. See United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at
227-28. The Court stated, "[s]hould it be the intent of Congress to have the EPA approve a state
NPDES program regulating federal as well as nonfederal point soures ... it may legislate to make
that intention manifest." Id.
194. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. In Hancock, the Court saw permits as both
procedural and enforcement requirements. In one part of the decision the Court framed the issue as
"whether Congress intended that the enforcement mechanisms of federally approved state imple-
mentation plans, in this case permit systems, would be available to the states to enforce [federal
compliance].... In the case before us the Court of Appeals concluded that federal installations were
obligated to comply with state substantive requirements as opposed to state procedural require-
ments." Id.
196. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 185-86.
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munity to "procedural" requirements, Congress clearly manifested its in-
tent to allow states to enforce the law against federal facilities.
The final modification answers the Supreme Court's criticism in
United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Board, that merely requiring federal facilities to comply with state re-
quirements to the same extent as any person does not imply that the
states can enforce those requirements. 97 The answer came in the form
of language requiring federal facilities to comply with state requirements
in the same manner as any person. This language must subject federal
facilities to state enforcement requirements because that is the manner by
which states make private citizens comply with substantive requirements.
A recent Supreme Court case supports this interpretation of "the
same manner" language. In Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 98 the
Supreme Court interpreted language in the sovereign immunity waiver of
Section 290 of the Workers' Compensation Act' 99 similar to the same
manner and extent language in RCRA. The Court found that language
that held the federal government liable "in the same way and to the same
extent" as a private person applied to state imposed penalties for failure
to comply with state law.2° ° A closer analysis of this case will help to
interpret the waiver in RCRA.
In Miller, the Supreme Court had to decide whether an Ohio law,
providing an additional penalty when a worker suffered injury as a result
of the employer violating state safety provisions, applied to a federally
owned facility. 20' The plant was owned by the Department of Energy
and operated under contract by Goodyear Corporation. Goodyear ar-
gued that the supremacy clause barred the application of the state work-
ers' compensation safety requirements to a federally owned facility.20 2
The Supreme Court held that the rule in Hancock and United States EPA
v. California ex rel State Water Resources Control Board, requiring a
sovereign immunity waiver be clear and unambiguous, controlled the
case.
203
In relevant part the workers' compensation statute2°4 provides that:
States shall have the power and authority to apply such laws [workers'
197. United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 212.
See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
198. 108 S. Ct. 1704 (1988).
199. 40 U.S.C. § 290 (1982).
200. Miller, 108 S. Ct. at 1710.
201. Id. at 1707.
202. Id. at 1708.
203. Id. at 1709.
204. 40 U.S.C. § 290.
1989]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
compensation laws] to all lands and premises owned or held by the
United States of America ... in the same way and to the same extent
as if said premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State
within whose exterior boundaries the place may be. 20 5
The Court interpreted this language to mean that section 290 requires
the same workers' compensation award for an employee injured at a fed-
erally owned facility as the employee would receive if working for a
wholly private facility. 2° 6 This interpretation squares exactly with the
language of the RCRA waiver which applies to federal facilities "in the
same manner, and to the same extent, as any person is subject to such
requirements... ,207 In RCRA's legislative history, the Senate declared
that it expected federal facilities to comply with all requirements respect-
ing the control and abatement of hazardous waste disposal as if the
agency were a private citizen.20 8 Thus, the intent behind the RCRA sov-
ereign immunity waiver parallels the waiver in the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act.
It might be argued that despite the similarities between the sover-
eign immunity waiver in RCRA and the Workers' Compensation Act,
the Court's reasoning in Miller does not apply because of the parentheti-
cal found in the RCRA waiver which includes a list of four requirements:
permits, reporting, injunctive relief, and sanctions to enforce injunctive
relief.2° 9 This interpretation does not square with a facial analysis of the
waiver or the legislative history behind the waiver. If the word "includ-
ing" were limiting, it would directly contradict the "all" modifying the
requirements with which federal facilities must comply. Further, if the
parenthetical were limiting, the only procedural requirements with which
the federal facilities would have to comply would be those regarding per-
mits or reporting. The court in Ohio v. United States Department of En-
ergy noted several of the requirements not specifically mentioned in the
parenthetical with which federal facilities must comply to show that
Congress intended the parenthetical to be exemplary, not limiting.210
The addition of "all" in front of "requirements" and "substantive
and procedural" behind requirements negates a reading of the parenthet-
ical as limiting because the waiver was enacted after the Court's decision
in Hancock. The addition is a direct response to the major objection that
205. Miller, 108 S. Ct. at 1710.
206. Id. at 1711.
207. 42 U.S.C. § 6961.
208. S. REP. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 6961.
210. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 765 (S.D. Ohio 1988). See infra
note 263 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court had in applying the original sovereign immunity
waiver to permit requirements. 211 Because Congress failed to put "all"
in front of requirements, the Court limited the definition of requirements
to substantive requirements. The two modifiers around "requirements"
are actually redundant as either would satisfy the Court's qualms in
Hancock. The addition of "all" shows the intent of Congress to waive
sovereign immunity with regard to enforcement requirements as well as
substantive requirements. The addition of the words "substantive and
procedural" broadens the waiver to include enforcement requirements
because the Court included enforcement requirements within its defini-
tion of procedural requirements in Hancock.
2 12
The legislative history supports reading the parenthetical as exem-
plary. The Senate report on section 6001 twice stated that federal facili-
ties must meet all substantive and procedural requirements, specifically
permit requirements. If the Senate had wanted the language to be limit-
ing it would have stated that the waiver applied only to permits, not "all
requirements, specifically permits. ' 213 Since the parenthetical is not lim-
iting, the scope of the sovereign immunity waiver must be as broad as the
waiver in the Workers' Compensation Act and include civil penalties im-
posed under state law.
A comparison of the House and Senate bills also shows that the
waiver should be read broadly. When Congress adopted the RCRA
waiver it adopted the strong Senate waiver as opposed to the House pro-
posal, which would have continued to shield federal facilities from state
regulations.214 The House report on RCRA recommended subjecting
federal facilities to "all standards developed by EPA ... in the treatment
of hazardous wastes." 2 15 When Congress adopted the waivers in the
CAA and CWA the House had written stronger waivers than the Senate
waivers modeled after the RCRA waiver. 21 6 Congress adopted the
House versions for those two Acts.217 In all three cases Congress
adopted the stronger waiver regardless of from which house it came. Be-
cause Congress wrote the RCRA waiver first and because the Senate ver-
sion had no House counterpart, the RCRA waiver should be compared
211. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
212. 426 U.S. at 183.
213. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. at 765.
214. H. REP. No. 94-1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. I, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6289.
215. Id.
216. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21210,
21212 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
217. Id.
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to the Supreme Court decisions in Hancock and United States EPA v.
California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board to determine its
extent, and not to the subsequently written waivers in the CAA and
CWA. Thus, procedural requirements includes enforcement
requirements.
Congress also wrote other sections of the RCRA to respond to the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Hancock. The Supreme Court refused to
extend the requirement waiver to permits because Congress did not re-
quire a permit program as part of a state's SIP.21 8 Congress remedied
this problem in section 3006 of RCRA, describing state permit programs.
Section 3006(b) 219 makes state enforcement of permits an integral part of
its permitting program. Specifically, section 3006(b)(3) 220 does not allow
the Administrator to approve a state permit program unless it has an
adequate enforcement component. Further, section 3006(d) states that
"[a]ny action taken by a State under a hazardous waste program author-
ized under this section shall have the same force and effect as action
taken by the Administrator under this subchapter. '221
The congressional intent behind section 3006 reveals Congress' pref-
erence for state enforcement of Subtitle C of RCRA. In its report the
Senate stated that "[t]he permit program should be carried out to the
extent possible by the states following EPA established criteria. '222 The
Senate also proclaimed that the Administrator could not object to a state
issued permit if the state demonstrated that it "was issued under an ade-
quate permit program with necessary enforcement authority. ' 223 The
emphasis on enforcement in both section 3006 defining state permit re-
quirements and in the Senate's report indicate that RCRA made the issu-
ance and enforcement of permits an integral part of state programs while
the pre-1977 CAA did not.
The 1984 RCRA amendments add further evidence that RCRA
waives sovereign immunity with regard to civil penalties. Section
3007(c), 224 enacted in November of 1984, allows states with an author-
ized hazardous waste program to undertake annual inspections of each
federal facility in the state "to enforce its compliance with this sub-
chapter and the regulations promulgated thereunder. ' 225 If Congress did
218. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 184.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1982), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (Supp. V 1987).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b)(3), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b)(3) (Supp. V 1987).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d) (in reference to 42 U.S.C. § 6921-34 (1982)).
222. S. REP. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976).
223. Id.
224. 42 U.S.C. § 6927(c) (Supp. V 1987).
225. Id.
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not mean to waive sovereign immunity with regard to enforcement re-
quirements, it would not have clearly given state agencies the right to
enforce federal compliance with RCRA. The act as a whole supports no
other reading.
Courts have had two difficulties determining whether RCRA waives
sovereign immunity with regard to all enforcement requirements, the
same two difficulties discussed above. 226 First, some courts have had dif-
ficulty determining whether the "all requirements" language in the
waiver applies to enforcement requirements as well as to substantive and
procedural requirements. 227 The second problem, related to the first, is
whether Congress meant the parenthetical phrase after requirements to
be exclusive or exemplary. 228 The next section will review the lower
court decisions regarding these problems and then analyze those
decisions.
1. The Meaning of "Requirements"
Two cases, California v. Walter 229 and Florida Department of Envi-
ronmental Regulation v. Silvex Corporation,230 support the restrictive def-
inition of requirements which subsequent courts have adopted. In
Walters the City of Los Angeles argued that in light of Hancock, the
addition of the word "all" in front of the word "requirements" was a
sufficient modification from the language of the CAA interpreted by the
Court in Hancock to include criminal sanctions as a requirement. 23' In
Silvex, the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (DER)
claimed that in section 6961 Congress waived the Navy's sovereign im-
munity with regard to hazardous waste actions.232 Both courts rejected
these arguments, deciding that the waivers applied to permits and not to
criminal sanctions or civil penalties respectively.
In Walters, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Los
Angeles' argument because it did not believe that Congress meant to in-
clude criminal sanctions as requirements. The court distinguished crimi-
226. See infra notes 229-74 and accompanying text.
227. See infra notes 229-49.
228. See infra notes 250-74.
229. 751 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1985). The case involved an attempt by the City of Los Angeles to
prosecute the Veterans Administration (and its head, Walters) for the criminal violation of RCRA.
Id. at 978. Specifically, the city claimed that the Veterans Administration (VA) had illegally dis-
posed of infectious medical wastes. Id.
230. 606 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Fla. 1985). In Silvex, the Florida State Department of Environ-
mental Resources (DER) sued several defendants including the Navy for the negligent discharge of
hazardous waste. Id. at 161.
231. 751 F.2d at 978.
232. 606 F. Supp. at 161.
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nal sanctions from procedural requirements by labeling criminal
sanctions "enforcement requirements. ' 233 Similarly, in Silvex, the court
adopted the Navy's argument that the Congress expressly limited the
sovereign immunity waiver to substantive and procedural requirements,
not civil penalties.234
Claiming to use the legislative history of section 6001 and the
Supreme Court decisions in Hancock and United States EPA v. California
ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board to support its findings, the
court in Silvex held that RCRA waived immunity to only limited objec-
tive requirements (i.e. disposal site construction standards).235 The court
used the legislative history to show that the Senate intended the waiver in
RCRA to apply to "all substantive and procedural requirements, and
specifically any requirements to obtain permits" to limit the waiver to
regulatory guidelines rather than enforcement requirements. 236 Then the
court applied the logic of Hancock and United States EPA v. California
ex reL State Water Resources Control Board to determine that the waiv-
ers in the CAA and CWA applied to state objective standards and regula-
tory requirements, not penalties. 237
The precedents set by Walters and Silvex influenced other courts
that heard similar cases involving RCRA.238 However, recent cases are
rejecting the Walters and Silvex line of reasoning in favor of a reading of
the waiver more in line with its facial language. In Colorado v. United
States Department of the Army, 239 the court refused to apply the logic of
Silvex to the case at bar because it found that Colorado's RCRA regula-
tions set forth "sufficiently specific and precise standards, subject to uni-
form application, to satisfy the term 'requirements.' "240 The court held
that the waiver is, "all-encompassing since it provides that federal facili-
ties are subject to 'all Federal, State, Interstate, and local requirements,
both substantive and procedural .... ' ",241
The court in Ohio v. United States Department of Energy has also
233. 751 F.2d at 978.
234. 606 F. Supp. at 162-64.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 162.
237. Id. at 163. See supra notes 92-94.
238. See California v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988); Meyer v.
United States Coast Guard, 644 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. N.C. 1986).
239. 707 F. Supp. 1562 (D. Colo. 1989).
240. Id. at 1572. The court noted that the Colorado regulations tracked almost verbatim, the
federal regulations promulgated by the EPA that already applied to federal facilities. This tracking
exposed the Army's argument that Colorado's regulations were not precise and objective enough to
withstand a sovereign immunity challenge as specious. Id.
241. Id.
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concluded that the sovereign immunity waiver in RCRA encompasses
enforcement requirements, including civil penalties. 242 In that case Ohio
sued the United States Department of Energy (DOE) for injunctive re-
lief, damages, civil penalties, and declaratory relief for improperly dis-
posing of hazardous wastes at a nuclear weapons processing facility, and
for releasing radioactive wastes into the air, water, and soil.243 The DOE
moved to dismiss civil penalties claiming sovereign immunity. 244 Ohio
claimed that civil penalties were included in the waived requirements. 245
The court rejected the defendant's arguments and analyzed the lan-
guage in section 6001 as a response to the Supreme Court's decisions in
Hancock v. Train and United States EPA v. California ex rel State Water
Resources Control Board.2" The court used a two step reasoning process
to find that the language of the RCRA waiver, waiving sovereign immu-
nity for "all requirements substantive and procedural" included enforce-
ment requirements. First, the court considered Congress' use of the
word "all" as a direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in Han-
cock.247 Second, the court adopted the Supreme Court's opinion that
procedural requirements included enforcement requirements. 248  The
conclusion followed easily. If the language in section 6001 waives sover-
eign immunity with regard to permits and permits are enforcement tools,
then the "all requirements" language must include all enforcement tools
including civil penalties.249
2. The Meaning of Sanctions
California v. Walters also set the precedential stage for a limited def-
inition of the sanctions that RCRA waived. In Walters the court empha-
sized that section 6001 limited procedural requirements enforceable
against federal facilities to those, "(including any requirements for per-
mits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanc-
tions as may be imposed by a court to support such relief). ' 250 The
court held that the mention of sanctions for injunctive relief highlighted
242. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 764 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
243. Id. at 761.
244. Id. at 761-62. The plaintiffs also argued that in looking at the statute as a whole, since the
citizen suit provision of RCRA waives sovereign immunity with regard to civil penalties, Congress
intended 6961 to waive immunity to civil penalties. Id. at 762-63. See infra notes 264-68 and ac-
companying text.
245. Id.
246. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
247. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. at 764.
248. Id. See Hancock, 426 U.S. at 183.
249. Department of Energy, 689 F. Supp. at 765.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 6961.
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the absence of any mention of criminal sanctions.251 The court con-
cluded that RCRA waived sanctions only to enforce injunctive relief.252
Although this court of appeals decision related to criminal sanctions, it
set precedent in the Ninth Circuit regarding civil sanctions as well. 253
In McClellen Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger (MESS), a
subsequent Ninth Circuit case, a citizens group filed a complaint against
the Department of Defense alleging that it violated certain provisions of
RCRA and the CWA. 254 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and civil
penalties because McClellan Air Force Base improperly stored hazard-
ous waste in violation of RCRA. 255 The district court rebuffed the plain-
tiff's claims for civil penalties holding that the sovereign immunity
waiver in RCRA did not waive federal immunity with regard to civil
penalties. 25 6  The court adopted the limiting definition of sanctions
adopted in Walters. The court reasoned that the waiver only stretched to
include sanctions to enforce injunctive relief.257 Since the imposition of
sanctions for injunctive relief implies that a party has violated a prior
court order and since no prior court order existed, the court held that it
could not possibly place sanctions on the defendant. 258 When the court
turned to the legislative history of the waiver it could not find a clear and
unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity. 259 Two courts outside the
Ninth Circuit have also adopted the MESS reasoning to limit the availa-
bility of sanctions to the enforcement of injunctive relief.26°
The court in Ohio v. United States Department of Energy faced the
same arguments as the court in MESS, that Congress intended the paren-
thetical list in the waiver to be an exclusive list of the sanctions to which
the federal government waived sovereign immunity. 261 The plaintiffs ar-
251. California v. Walters, 751 F.2d at 978.
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
254. 655 F. Supp. 601, 602 (E.D. Cal. 1986). Although the court in MESS analyzed whether the
waiver in RCRA applied to civil sanctions (as opposed to Walters which considered the waiver's
application to criminal sanctions) the court came up with the same result and same reasoning as the
Walters court.
255. Id. One can only marvel at the irony that the same agencies responsible for protecting
American soil from foreign invasion are consistently the worst polluters and hence pose the greatest
danger to the very soil and people they are sworn to defend.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 604.
260. Meyer v. United States Coast Guard, 644 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. N.C. 1986), and Ohio v.
United States Dep't of the Air Force, 17 Envt'l L. Rep. (Envt'l L. Inst.) 21210 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
Although Ohio v. Air Force involved the court's interpretation of the CAA, the court used the MESS
analysis to determine that RCRA did not waive sovereign immunity with regard to civil penalties
while the CAA did.
261. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 764 (S.D. Ohio 1988). The De-
[Vol. 65:581
WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE
gued that the list in the parenthetical was merely exemplary. From that
argument the plaintiffs argued that the sanctions included in section 6001
included civil penalties. 262 The court agreed with the plaintiffs and did
not find the parenthetical list modifying substantive and procedural re-
quirements a barrier to a broad definition of sanctions. The court cited
examples of requirements not in the parenthetical list to show that the
parenthetical was not limiting, including, "completion of manifests to
identify hazardous waste being transported by truck, . . . writing contin-
gency plans to prepare hazardous facilities for fires, explosions, and other
hazardous waste emergencies.... planning for safe closure of hazardous
waste after use, . . . and keeping an operating log to record locations of
hazardous waste .... ",263
More recently, in Colorado v. United States Department of the Army,
the district court for Colorado held that the RCRA sovereign immunity
waiver waived sovereign immunity with regard to civil penalties.264 The
court read RCRA's sovereign immunity waiver along with its citizen suit
provision, section 7002,265 to find that a state could seek civil penalties
against federal facilities.266 Section 7002 allows persons to "commence a
civil action on his own behalf ... against any person including (a) the
United States . "267 Since RCRA includes a state within the definition
of person,268 and section 6001 requires federal facilities to comply with
state requirements, a state can sue a federal facility that violates state
law.
The courts in Walters and Silvex misread history as well as the
Supreme Court cases that they cite. The court in Silvex clearly misread
the Senate report. The Senate amendment that the case quotes states
that the waiver applies to all substantive and procedural requirements,
partment of Energy had an easier job of supporting its case because of the precedent supporting its
position. Defendant's arguments read like a summary of the previous cases on this matter. The
defendant argued four points to support its position. First, the defendant claimed that the plain
language of § 6961 did not "clearly and unambiguously" waive sovereign immunity with regard to
civil penalties. Next, the defendant argued that the "normal meaning" of requirements does not
include penalties or injunction. Third, the defendant argued that the reference to sanctions to en-
force injunctive relief excluded sanctions with regard to civil penalties and limited sanctions to in-
junctive relief only. Finally, to answer Ohio's extension of the citizen suit definition of person to the
sovereign immunity waiver section, the defendant noted that the definition section of RCRA does
not include the United States as a person.
262. Id. at 763.
263. Id. at 765.
264. 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1570-72 (D. Colo. 1989).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (Supp. V 1987).
266. Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1565-66.
267. 42 U.S.C. § 6 972(a)(1), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1982).
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specifically permit requirements. 269 The court read out the "all" and
read the word "specifically" as "only." This selective reading does not
do justice to the Senate's report.
Additionally, the courts misapply the precedents in Hancock and
United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Board. The Silvex and Colorado v. United States Department of the Army
courts used the Supreme Court precedents to limit the definition of re-
quirements to "objective state standards of control. ' 270 These courts ig-
nored that in defining requirements, the Supreme Court was limiting
itself to defining substantive requirements. 271 By waiving sovereign im-
munity to procedural requirements as well as substantive requirements,
Congress legislatively reversed the Supreme Court's definition of require-
ments. The Supreme Court's own logic requires that the courts include
enforcement requirements within the definition of procedural require-
ments. In Hancock, the Court virtually equated permit programs, en-
forcement requirements, and procedural requirements. 272
The decision of the court in Ohio v. United States Department of
Energy is more reasonable than the decisions of courts failing to find a
waiver of sovereign immunity. Those courts that limit the definition of
requirements to objective standards have failed to realize that that defini-
tion applied only to the pre-Hancock waivers. When Congress added the
words "all," "substantive" and "procedural" to modify requirements it
expanded the waiver to include enforcement requirements such as
permits.
Those courts that limit sanctions only to those imposed to enforce
injunctive relief also seem to interpret the waiver artificially. If the par-
enthetical were truly limiting, the Act would require federal facilities to
comply with all substantive requirements, two procedural requirements
(permit and reporting), and one sanction requirement (sanctions for in-
junctive relief). Congress intended federal facilities to comply with all
requirements "respecting control and abatement of solid waste or haz-
ardous waste disposal as if the agency were a private citizen. ' 273 The
Supreme Court's holding in Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller274 indicates
that Congress could not make a clearer waiver of sovereign immunity.
269. Silvex v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 606 F. Supp. 159, 163 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
270. Id. at 163.
271. See Hancock, 426 U.S. at 188-89 and United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water
Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 215.
272. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 183.
273. S. REP. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976).
274. 108 S. Ct. 1704 (1988).
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V. CONCLUSION
Of all the waivers presented, the waiver in RCRA is the most impor-
tant for two reasons. First, the CAA clearly and unambiguously waives
sovereign immunity with regard to state imposed sanctions. Second, the
cases do not indicate that water pollution from federal facilities is as big a
problem as the solid waste disposal problem. Further, the Supreme
Court's decision in United States EPA v. California ex rel. State Water
Resources Control Board indicates that the EPA could enforce permits
against federal facilities if they violate the CWA. Current Justice Depart-
ment policy makes EPA enforcement of RCRA impossible. 275 Thus, if
the states cannot enforce RCRA, then federal facilities will be free to
destroy the environment. Current news articles indicate that federal fa-
cilities are no more serious about complying with federal pollution laws
today than they were in the 1950s. 276
Of the enforcement penalties available, civil penalties are the most
important because they get results. In Colorado v. United States Depart-
ment of the Army, the court noted that it was impossible to expect the
Justice Department, representing the EPA, to enforce RCRA while also
representing the federal facility being sued. 277 Therefore, the most effec-
275. Recently, the Justice Department further undermined environmental enforcement at fed-
eral facilities with new restraints on EPA enforcement options. According to the Justice Depart-
ment, the EPA cannot issue administrative orders at federal facilities under RCRA. EPA
Memorandum on Enforcement Actions at Federal Facilities Under RCRA and CERCLA, 18 Envtl.
Rep. (BNA) 41:3341 (March 11, 1988). The EPA must first inform the violating facility through a
Notice of Noncompliance (NON). After the EPA issues a NON, the EPA regional office then nego-
tiates with the facility until a settlement is reached and embodied in a federal Facility Compliance
Agreement. These agreements are subject to numerous administrative appeals and some have taken
over two years to negotiate. Because violations do not result in financial penalties, federal facilities
have little incentive to comply with the law. If states cannot impose civil penalties, there is little
hope of getting federal facilities to clean up their act.
276. Coates, Arms Plant Pollution Comes Back to Haunt Government Agency, Chicago Tribune,
Jun. 18, 1989, at 1, col. 1; Wald, US. Agrees in Landmark Accord to Cleanup of Nuclear Complex,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
277. In Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, the court admonished the Justice Depart-
ment for claiming to be able to represent both the Army and the EPA regarding the clean up of one
of the most polluted dump sites in the country. The court noted:
Were I to dismiss this action, the Army's cleanup efforts would go unchecked by any
parties whose interest are in any real sense adverse to those of the Army. The same Justice
Department attorneys have repeatedly claimed to represent both the Army and the EPA in
this action, even though the Army is a defendant and the EPA acts for the United States as
a plaintiff....
Since it is the EPA's job to achieve a clean up as quickly and thoroughly as possible,
and since the Army's obvious financial interest is to spend as little money and effort as
possible on the cleanup, I cannot imagine how one attorney can vigorously and whole-
heartedly advocate both positions.
Having the State actively involved as a party would guarantee the salutary effect of a
truly adversary proceeding that would be more likely, in the long run, to achieve a thor-
ough cleanup.
Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (D. Colo. 1989).
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tive way to enforce RCRA against federal facilities is to allow states to
impose civil penalties on federal facilities violating RCRA. Recent
trends indicate that more circuits are rejecting the analysis of the Ninth
Circuit and finding that RCRA's sovereign immunity waiver allows
states to impose civil penalties on federal facilities. 278
Congress and the EPA are split on the issue of whether RCRA
waives sovereign immunity to state imposed civil penalties. In recent tes-
timony before the Senate, F. Henry Habicht, the nominee for EPA Dep-
uty Administrator, did not endorse an interpretation of RCRA's
sovereign immunity waiver that included state imposed civil penalties. 279
Habicht stated that "the prospect that states would issue penalties
against the federal government has to be weighed against the ability of
the federal Treasury to handle such charges. ' 280 Habicht interpreted the
waiver incorrectly because he used cost-benefit analysis, not statutory
analysis, to determine Congress' intent to waive sovereign immunity.
During the same testimony, Senator Max Baucus (D. Me.) stated that he
believed that the current waiver did waive sovereign immunity against
state suits.28 1
In light of this controversy, Congress could pass a sovereign immu-
nity waiver that clears up any ambiguity that the courts might imagine.
A bill has recently passed the House which would strengthen the
waiver.28 2 This bill would make two major changes in the current
waiver. First, it would modify the requirements by including "all admin-
istrative orders, and civil, and administrative, penalties and fines."' 28 3
More importantly, the bill changes the language describing the require-
ments waived to remove confusion regarding the parenthetical. The cur-
rent act waives sovereign immunity to "all ... requirements (including
any requirement for permits on reporting on any provisions for injunc-
278. Id. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Maine v.
United States Department of the Navy, 702 F. Supp 322 (D. Maine 1988).
279. 20 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 142 (May 19, 1989). However, Habicht may be unaware that EPA's
regulations undercut his interpretation of RCRA. In Maine v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 702
F. Supp. 322, the district court held that RCRA waived sovereign immunity with regard to civil
penalties because the EPA included the United States and its instrumentalities within its definition of
person. The court reasoned that in light of the controversy surrounding the statute it would look to
the EPA's interpretation of the statute to determine whether it waived sovereign immunity with
regard to civil penalties. It found the inclusion of the United States within the definition was evi-
dence of the EPA's belief that the federal facilities were subject to the same penalties as private
polluters.
280. Id. at 143.
281. Id.
282. H.R. 1056, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
283. Id. § 2(a)(3).
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tive relief and such sanctions to enforce such relief) .... ,"284 Some courts
have interpreted the waiver to be limited only to the requirements in-
cluded in the parenthetical. 28 5 H.R. 1056 states "the ... requirements
referred to in this subsection include, but are not limited to, all adminis-
trative orders .... ,,286 The change of language clearly reflects the intent
of Congress to have the waiver read broadly. Second, H.R. 1056 would
legislate the Justice Department's unitary government theory out of
existence by prohibiting the EPA from treating federal facilities that vio-
late RCRA any differently in any respect from private persons. 287 These
changes would make the RCRA's sovereign immunity waiver as strong
as the CAA's.
Finally, H.R. 1056 amends section 6005 of RCRA to include "each
department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States. ' 28 8 This
makes the RCRA conform to the CAA, which includes the United States
within the definition of person.289 This definition further clarifies the ex-
tent of the sovereign immunity waiver.
However, the current language of the RCRA sovereign immunity
waiver is strong enough to waive sovereign immunity to state imposed
civil penalties. The waiver answers all of the objections that the Supreme
Court raised in its opinions in Hancock and United States EPA v. Califor-
nia ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board. First, the waiver modi-
fies requirements with the word "all". Second, the waiver waives
sovereign immunity to both substantive and procedural requirements.
Since in Hancock the Supreme Court considered enforcement and proce-
dural requirements to be one and the same, the waiver should allow
states to impose civil penalties. Finally, by requiring federal facilities to
comply in the same manner as any other person, Congress consented and
the Supreme Court has affirmed that the waiver allows states to impose
civil penalties.
284. 42 U.S.C. § 6961.
285. See supra notes 250-63 and accompanying text.
286. H.R. 1056(a)(3), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
287. H.R. 1056(b)(i). See supra note 6.
288. H.R. 1056(a)(3), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
289. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.

